S Jaishankar Views On India’s Foreign Policy Part-2

Table of Contents

SO LOOKING FROM THE PAST EXPERIENCES- WHAT ARE THE OPTIONS LEFT WITH INDIA IN PRESENT & FUTURE FOR INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT?

These can be captured in 5 baskets of issues

NEED FOR GREATER REALISM IN POLICY

Swami Vivekananda perceptively described the world as a gymnasium where nations come to make themselves strong.
Our focus on diplomatic visibility sometimes led to overlooking the harsher realities of hard security.
E.g. – The early misreading of Pakistan’s intentions can perhaps be explained away by lack of experience.
But the reluctance to attach overriding priority to securing borders even a decade later is much more difficult to justify.
The creation of the post of Chief of Defence Staff half-a- century later shows a very different mindset.
In 1972 at Shimla, India chose to bet on an optimistic outlook on Pakistan.
At the end of the day, it resulted in both a revanchist Pakistan and a continuing problem in Jammu & Kashmir.
A case can certainly be made for a more grounded Indian approach to international relations.

ECONOMIC DRIVERS TO GUIDE DIPLOMACY MORE

The economy drives diplomacy; not the other way around.
If one considers all major growth stories since 1945, common feature was extraordinary focus put on leveraging the global environment.
China did that with great effect, initially with the USSR and then with the US and the West. The Asian ‘tiger economies’ practiced it as well, using Japan, the US and now China.
India too approached its various relationships over the last seven decades, but not always with the same single-mindedness.
India should not go back to old dogmas such as- Inward looking economy, self reliance, import substitution. India must engage with the world and go for more trade.
But at the same time Free Trade Agreements poses its own negative impact on industry at home.
China, of course, poses a special trade challenge even without an FTA (evident from Trade deficit)
But this should not be misread with the recent event related to

MANAGING THE MULTIPLE GLOBAL COMPLEXITIES

Any quest to maximize options and expand space naturally requires engaging multiple players.
The concept of Unipolar & Bipolar is gone and we are now in a multi – polar world.
This is a game best played on the front-foot, appreciating that progress on any one front strengthens one’s hand on all others.
In that sense, it is having many balls up in the air at the same time and displaying the confidence and dexterity to drop none.
How do you reconcile a Howdy Modi, a Mamallapuram and a Vladivostok?
Or the RIC (Russia-India-China) with JAI (Japan-America-India)? Or the Quad with the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization)?
An Iran with the Saudis or Israel with Palestine?
The answer is in a willingness to look beyond dogma and enter the real world of convergences.
Think of it, not just as arithmetic but as calculus.

TAKING CALCULATED RISK

It is evident from past experiences that a low-risk foreign policy is only likely to produce limited rewards.
When India departed from this mode, some risks paid off while others did not.
The cumulative impression was thus of a steady and middle of the road approach as India’s influence grew.
But the truth is that ascending up the global ladder did require taking big calls, whether conventional or nuclear, political or economic.
Not all risks are necessarily dramatic; many just require the confident calculations and determined follow up of day-to- day management.
But their aggregate impact can result in a quantum jump in global positioning.
To a certain degree, we see that happening today. Like- Uri, Balakot, Article 370

READING THE GLOBAL TEA LEAVES RIGHT

The foreign policy of all nations is set against the backdrop of global contradictions.
They reflect an assessment of opportunities and compulsions, and of risks and rewards.
A misreading of the larger landscape can prove costly.
Going to the United Nations on Jammu & Kashmir clearly misread the intent of the Anglo-American alliance.
In the 1960s, 1980s and again after 2001, we grossly underestimated the relevance of Pakistan to American and Chinese global strategy.
This is not to suggest that India has not had its successes.
Indo-Soviet and later Indo-Russian relations are a direct product of our global strategizing.
Identifying the opportunities thrown up by the structure of world politics can also help mitigate risks.
We saw that, for example, in respect to France after the 1998 nuclear tests.

Today, an appreciation of world politics must include a proper understanding- Of Sino-US contradictions, Of growing multi-polarity, Of weaker multilateralism, Of larger economic and political rebalancing, Of greater space for regional powers, and Of the world of convergences.