The Hindu Editorial Analysis | 18th Sep’19

Table of Contents

Fire to fuel

India must brace for the impact of oil supply cuts after the drone attacks in Saudi Arabia
The immediate impact of last week’s drone attacks on the Saudi Aramco-owned Khurais oilfield and Abqaiq oil processing facility has been the suspension of more than half of Saudi Arabia’s daily crude oil output, thereby affecting contribution to global supply. While the Saudis have restored a portion of the supply that was hit, the sudden disruption resulted in the highest spike (nearly 20%) in Brent crude prices in more than a decade before the U.S. President’s statement that America would release some of its strategic reserves resulted in the price easing back to $66 per barrel (a 10% increase over the day). While the Houthi militia fighting Yemen’s Saudi Arabia-backed government in a fouryear-long civil war claimed responsibility for the attacks, the U.S. has suggested that Iran was responsible for them. After a belligerent statement that the U.S. was “locked and loaded” to respond to this alleged provocation from Iran, Mr. Trump suggested that he was still trying to draw the Iranians to make a deal over their nuclear programme. Iran’s response has been to dismiss the allegations accompanied by a refusal to talk on the U.S.’s terms. Yet, for all his bluster and erratic policy decisions, Mr. Trump has sought to avoid conflict or to engage in new military adventures — an opening Iran must seize and work toward de-escalation through diplomacy. Meanwhile, the Saudis must halt their Yemen intervention and leave it to the UN to broker peace in a battered country. The Saudi-led military campaign, buttressed with logistics support from the U.S. and the U.K., has only brought a stalemate in Yemen, while escalating the conflict to include energy supply targets that the world had imagined to be secure.
The sudden disruption of global crude oil supply is the unintended consequence of the unravelling of the painstakingly crafted P5+1+EU-Iran nuclear deal, the Saudis’ reckless adventure in Yemen and the Iranian empowerment of its proxies in West Asia as a response. This development is bound to affect several emerging economies, including India’s. The Union Petroleum Ministry has sought to allay fears of a supply cut by relaying messages of assurance from Aramco officials, but there is already an indication that crude prices would rise further due to an increase in the risk premium, leading to increased fuel pump costs. With India importing more than two-thirds of its oil from West Asia, a price surge is expected to impact the current account, and will result in further currency depreciation as was the case on Monday. Higher fuel costs and the imported inflation could also hurt the consumer at a time of a slowdown in the economy. The government should be prepared to handle the fallout with steps such as re-evaluating the excise duties on petroleum products.
Yemen is in the south-west corner of the Arabian Peninsula. Though most Yemenis vouch for national unity, the northern and southern parts of the country are two distinct entities. While the north is hilly and fertile and has some oil reserves, the southern part is mostly desert. The country has a population of around 27 million, with most living in the north. With GDP per capita of $944, which is less than half of India’s, Yemen’s poverty is a sharp contrast to the oil-riches of her northern neighbours.
The country is a tribal society with a strong sense of identity and kinship. While almost all Yemenis are Muslims, the population in the north is mostly Zaidi which is closer to the Shia sect followed in Iran.
The southerners are mostly Sunnis akin to a majority of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) citizens. While the north remains rooted in esoteric Zaidi traditions, the south which was colonized by the British to protect the sea route to India became relatively more westernized. South Yemen also had close links with India — the Nizam of Hyderabad relied on troops from Hadhramaut and the founder of Reliance Industries, Dhirubhai Ambani, began his career in Aden.
A history of conflict
The roots of the current imbroglio can be traced to the 1930s when north Yemen’s Imam ceded to the resurgent Kingdom of Saudi Arabia three provinces that many Yemenis still considered theirs. In the 1960s, north Yemen passed through a six-year-long civil war between the Imam’s fighters with Saudi support, against the Republican forces backed by Egypt. The civil war resulted in formation of Yemen Arab Republic in 1968; it also established a quasi-tradition of foreign dabbling in Yemeni politics.
A united Republic of Yemen was finally established in 1990. In 1994, a section of the south tried to secede, but the insurrection was put down after a short civil war.
In 2004, the northern Shia militia called “Ansar Allah” began an insurgency led by dissident cleric Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi, head of the Zaidi sect, against President Ali Abdullah Saleh. In November 2011, the Yemeni Arab Spring movement managed to remove Saleh who was replaced by his southern deputy Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi; Saleh and his clan remained influential till his assassination in 2017.
The al-Houthis rebelled against Mr. Hadi, ousting him in 2014 and forcing him to flee to Riyadh where he currently heads an ‘internationally recognised’ but largely ineffective government of Yemen. Saudi Arabia, apprehensive of an al-Houthi led Yemen becoming a surrogate of Iran (a regional Shia rival), cobbled a military coalition comprising the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt and other Sunni powers, with Pakistan reluctantly opting out. This coalition began a military campaign (“Operation Decisive Storm”) against the al-Houthis in March 2015, mostly through aerial bombardment, with army units supporting Mr. Hadi’s forces in southern Yemen; it also imposed a naval blockade. Four years on, the civil war has ground to a stalemate, with the alHouthis hunkering it out in the north. The United Nations has described Yemen to be currently in the grip of the world’s worst humanitarian catastrophe, with over 11,000 deaths and 3 million internally displaced.
During the past month, the Yemeni civil war seems to have entered its endgame, crossing two watersheds which could cast a shadow over India’s strategic national interests. Though both these developments were a long-time coming, each arrived with a bang and the potential to alter the future course of the conflict.

Drone attacks fallout

The most significant recent development in the Yemeni war has been the coordinated pre-dawn drone attacks last Saturday on the two Saudi upstream oil facilities at Abqaiq and Khurais. Though al-Houthi militia claimed responsibility, the details (10 drones were said to have engaged 17 targets) and sophistication (accurate hits nearly 1,300 km away from the Yemeni-Saudi border) leaves many questions unanswered. The strikes managed to put 5.7 million barrels per day of crude production out of action — over half of Saudi output and nearly 5% of global supplies. This caused an unprecedented 19% initial surge in oil prices on Monday, with Brent crude topping $71 a barrel. In a worst case scenario of the hostilities escalating or long-term derailment of Saudi production, oil prices could rise above $100 a barrel. These game-changing attacks not only mark a dramatic escalation of the conflict but also showcase the efficacy of an asymmetric warfare. With most hydrocarbon assets in the Gulf region currently defenceless against such attacks, this vulnerability is a foretaste of any future conflict in this tension-prone region.
The second development has been the growing rift within the Saudi-led coalition. In July 2019, the UAE announced a drawdown of its forces from Yemen where they have anchored the coalition ground forces.
By the end of August, Yemeni government forces were compelled to withdraw from southern port of Aden leaving it to the UAE-backed units of the Southern Transitional Council (STC), formed in mid-2017.
The STC calls for an independent South Yemen and is vehemently against the presence of Islamists in Yemen such as Islah party (member of Saudi-led coalition), al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and the Islamic State. The UAE is estimated to have trained and equipped thousands of fighters for the STC and other Yemeni militias. Abu Dhabi has also been expanding its strategic presence in neighbouring Eritrea and Somaliland.
Many observers foresee the current civil war coagulating into a de facto division of the Republic of Yemen roughly along the pre-1990 border: between an al-Houthi-led north and an STC-dominated south. Yemeni re-partition, if realised, may strongly impact the intra- and inter-state dynamics from Yemen itself to Yemen-Saudi ties and to the UAE-Iran-Saudi Arabia triangle.
Riyadh’s inability to attain its objectives in Yemen — despite enormous military resources at its disposal — may have long-term consequences, possibly making it more reliant on the large Sunni states such as Pakistan and Egypt. If a viable South Yemeni state takes shape, the STC’s symbiotic ties with the UAE would put Abu Dhabi in the driving seat along the geo-strategic Bab al-Mandeb Strait — a choke point connecting the Arabian Sea with the Red Sea onwards to the Suez Canal.
Indian interests
These two aforementioned developments are significant as most of India’s west-bound sea trade passes through Bab al Mandeb. India, therefore, needs to watch the evolving situation carefully and revive longstanding ties with the emerging stakeholders in Yemen, particularly along the southern coastal belt. The weekend’s drone attacks on Saudi oil facilities, too, have direct and serious implications for India as world’s third largest crude importer (with Saudi Arabia supplying nearly a fifth). The oil price surge hits India precisely when the economy is already struggling. A rise of oil price by even a dollar raises India’s annual oil bill by $1.5 billion, the country having spent $112 billion on crude imports in 2018-19.
A highly volatile oil market and a tense regional situation would also affect India’s thriving economic engagements as well as its manpower there.
Additionally, the attacks could affect Saudi Aramco’s ongoing negotiations of two major upstream investments in India totalling over $30 billion with Reliance Industries and the proposed Ratnagiri Refinery, respectively.
In view of direct negative fallout on our interests, India has rightly condemned the Abqaiq-Khurais attacks. Further, it needs to take evasive actions in order to avoid being trapped in the worst case scenario; such steps could include frontloading India’s biofuel programme, expanding its strategic petroleum reserves and diversifying its crude sources away from the West Asia.
At a different level, drones could emerge as a weapon of choice for motley anti-Indian non-state actors. Indeed, many of them are no worse than the al-Houthis in their resourcefulness and foreign sponsorships. Much of our infrastructure could be vulnerable to copy-cat attacks using such affordable and effective platforms available virtually off-the-shelf internationally. India’s defence and security experts need to urgently devise counter measures to mitigate such vulnerabilities.
India may dip into its strategic oil reserves stored in underground caverns at Mangaluru, Paddur (near Udupi) and Visakhapatnam, after the drone strikes on Saudi Arabian Oil Co or Saudi Aramco’s facility over the weekend sent shock waves across global oil markets, hitting supplies.
The attacks affected half of the Kingdom’s oil exports or about 5 per cent of the global supply and bringing the entire production back on stream could take weeks.
“The strategic reserves are available to us to utilise except for the portion reserved for the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company,” a top official at one of the state-run oil companies said.
“ADNOC has got some right on a part of the strategic reserves, the balance can be utilised by the government oil companies for the government’s requirements,” he said. If that happens, it could be the first time that India has counted on the strategic reserves to tide over a crisis. “The whole thing is emerging now. We have no clarity on what will happen. We are waiting and watching, but the strategic reserves can help to an extent in the short term,” the official said.

Storage capacity State-owned Indian Strategic Petroleum Reserve Ltd (ISPRL), which manages emergency oil reserves in the country, has already built 5.33 million tonnes (mt) of underground storage capacity at Visakhapatnam (1.33 million tonnes), Mangaluru (1.5 million tonnes) and Padur (2.5 million tonnes), which can help meet around 9.5 days of the country’s oil needs. Currently, the strategic reserves are not filled to its full capacity. Typically, India’s oil refiners hold a crude inventory of 15-20 days, including the crude on the high seas en-route to be delivered to customers. About 16 per cent of India’s crude imports comes from Saudi Arabia, the world’s biggest oil producer. This translates into a volume of 35-40 million tonnes. India is the world’s third largest oil importer

Expansion

In the 2017-18 budget speech by the Indian finance minister Arun Jaitley, it was announced that two more such caverns will be set up Chandikhole in Jajpur district of Odisha and Bikaner in Rajasthan as part of the second phase. This will take the strategic reserve capacity to 15.33 million tons.
Apart from this, India is planning to expand more strategic crude oil facilities in second phase at Rajkot in Gujarat and Padur in Udupi district of Karnataka The Rub’ al Khali is the largest contiguous sand desert (erg) in the world, encompassing most of the southern third of the Arabian Peninsula. The desert covers some 650,000 km2 (250,000 sq mi) (the area of long. 44°30′−56°30′E, and lat. 16°30′−23°00′N) including parts of Saudi Arabia, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. It is part of the larger Arabian Desert.
Recently, Israeli and Pakistani scholars and opinion-makers appear to have speculated about the possibility of the two states establishing diplomatic ties. This has cast fresh light on the changing dynamics in the region and Israel’s growing diplomatic reach and success.
Ever since Israel’s founding in 1948, it has been the endeavor of the Jewish state to overcome its regional isolation and enhance diplomatic relations with as many countries as possible. Apart from Turkey (1949), Egypt (1979) and Jordan (1994), none of the states in the region have recognized Israel. In fact, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) routinely pillories Israel for its “occupation” of Palestinian lands. The latest in this long acrimonious saga is the OIC’s call to convene an emergency session to discuss Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s remarks that, if re-elected, he would definitely annex the Jordan Valley in the West Bank and the northern Dead Sea.
The regular and scathing indictment by the Islamic world notwithstanding, Israel has been successful in gradually expanding its diplomatic profile beyond its immediate neighbourhood. Israel has established diplomatic relations with a large majority of the 193 UN member states.

India-Israel links

India established full diplomatic ties with Israel in January 1992. While many factors brought these two democracies together, it is a fact that both have successfully tackled state-centric threats throughout their history. Israel has successfully dealt with the gauntlet thrown down by the combined Arab opposition in 1948, 1967 and in 1973. India has prevailed over an acutely hostile and implacable Pakistan in every conflict since Partition. Both Israel and India have been victims of asymmetric warfare such as terrorism, which they continue to tackle with resolve.
Thanks to the dynamism infused in India’s foreign policy by the Indian Prime Minister, India’s interactions with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states have witnessed an impressive upward trajectory in recent times, encompassing economic and security ties. High-level political engagement with the West Asian region has been another hallmark of the Narendra Modi government.
No doubt, mutual apprehensions about Iran have nudged Israel and the Gulf states closer. Israel continues to look beyond the confines of its immediate region for greater economic and diplomatic Lebensraum. The Indo-Pacific region too is fast emerging as a prime focus of its endeavours.
While Israel established diplomatic ties with China at the same time as with India (January 1992), their relations have been primarily limited to the economic realm due to the American embargo on selling sophisticated weapons systems to Beijing. Israel, however, is expanding its arms sales to India and to countries in Southeast Asia.
Under a changing rubric, Israel is also looking at increasing its diplomatic footprint in South Asia and beyond. Forging closer ties with populous Asian Muslim countries such as Bangladesh and Indonesia would help it to gain greater legitimacy in the Islamic world.

Investment in the Arab world

Pakistan, however, is a different kettle of fish. The president of the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, Prof. Efraim Inbar, recently published an opinion piece in the Israeli newspaper, Haaretz, titled ‘Israel would welcome ties with Pakistan – Should India Worry?’ (https://bit.ly/2lWr8EE). He argues that Pakistan’s national interests would better be served by having ties with Israel, particularly since Israel carries weight in Washington and could perhaps mediate on recurring U.S.-Pakistan tensions. Concerns regarding Iran were also cited as a point of convergence.
A rapprochement between Israel and Pakistan appears to be far-fetched. The fly in the ointment is that Pakistan is considered the “sword-arm” of the Sunni world. Islamabad has invested considerably in the security of the Arab monarchies, including in Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Pakistani military units have been stationed in these countries to promote internal stability. Pakistani leaders such as Nawaz Sharif have sought and received refuge in the Arabian Peninsula.
Pakistan has used the platform provided by the OIC to drum up support for its stand on Kashmir, just as the OIC has done for the Palestinian issue. If Pakistan were to establish diplomatic ties with Israel, it would dilute its Islamic credentials and lead to a weakened support base within the OIC on Kashmir, a point acknowledged by Pakistani commentator Ayesha Siddiqa in an opinion article in the same newspaper following Prof. Inbar’s piece. The regime in Pakistan would also face the heat from its many domestic conservative Islamist groups. More importantly, in a recent interaction with the media, military spokesperson Maj. Gen. Asif Ghafoor refuted the possibility in response to a query about Pakistan’s recognition of Israel, stating that such stories were part of a propaganda war aimed at turning the general public against the country’s military.

The Iran factor

Iran is recognized as a potent threat by Israel and the Shia-Sunni divide in Pakistan is frequently a point of friction between Iran and Pakistan. However, as Ms. Siddiqa notes, Israel cannot expect Pakistan to be used against neighbouring Iran and risk the dangers of escalation in sectarian conflict, given that more than 20% of its population is Shia. Pakistan is unlikely to take any steps that could rock its relations with Iran.
In April 2015, Pakistan’s Parliament had turned down Riyadh’s request to join a Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen to fight the Houthi rebels supported by Iran.
India has successfully walked a tightrope between Israel and Palestine, and Israel may well hope to do so between Pakistan and India. However, it is not in Israel’s interest to seek diplomatic ties with a state that sponsors terrorism.
While it is the sovereign right of nation states to decide such matters, it appears that the idea of diplomatic ties between Israel and Pakistan remains, for now, a pie in the sky.
On September 2, Krishna Kumar Singh landed up at the post-mortem facility in Chunar, Mirzapur, Uttar Pradesh, for a routine assignment. There he noticed the family of a woman, who had allegedly hanged herself, misbehaving with the doctors. As the scuffle grew, the staff called for additional security. The gathering slowly turned into a mob.
Given his 18 years of experience as a tehsil correspondent for a Hindi daily, Singh’s instinct was to record the scene on camera. His action promptly angered the mob. Unlike Pawan Jaiswal, the journalist who had been charged the same day with criminal conspiracy for reporting that a primary school in the State was serving rotis and salt in its mid-day meal to children, Singh was physically assaulted in front of helpless policemen. He was whisked away to safety only after much humiliation. Though the U.P. police lodged an FIR against the assaulters, which Singh claims included supporters of a State BJP Minister, no arrests have been made yet.
This is not new to Singh. Over the years, his reports on corruption, including on a cartridges scam and illegal land allocation, have sent officials to prison. When the Samajwadi Party government was in power, Singh recalls being thrashed in a police station by the land mafia. But the latest assault has especially shaken him. Even his organization does not support him now, he says.
Threats, abuse and intimidation
There are many regional journalists like Singh in India who work at the district and tehsil levels in the Hindi hinterland without proper security. In exchange for doing their job, they face intimidation, threats, abuse, coercion and false police cases.
An year ago, when Jaiswal reported on illegal mining, the land mafia apparently warned him that “even the brakes of trucks can fail”. Such journalists often have little organizational backing or hope that their grievances will be redressed. Unlike journalists in the English language media, they are more vulnerable as regional bureaus are known to often turn the other way if they land in a controversy.
For a large and politically significant State like U.P., stringers and credible reporters at the lowest administrative levels are extremely important for State- or national-level news organisations.
Away from the safety net that is Lucknow, it is these reporters who handle all the risks that come with reporting on contentious issues which go on to occupy the national spotlight. Despite this, they are poorly paid, have few rights or statutory entitlements, are randomly sacked, and sometimes not even issued proper identity cards. This leaves them vulnerable to administrative excesses, political pressure and corruption.
“Earlier, mainstream media houses recruited professionals like lawyers and teachers to report at the district level for a nominal wage,” says Nagendra Pratap, former Editor of a Hindi daily in Varanasi and Gorakhpur. “But over time, newspapers and TV channels have started roping in contributors who are often poorly trained and lack other sources of income, without upgrading their pay structure.” This pushes some journalists to seek official and political patronage for survival. Hemant Tiwari, Uttar Pradesh Accredited Correspondents Committee president, admits that at the district level even the staff reporters of well-known Hindi dailies are asked to bring in advertisement revenue, while stringers work for commissions.
The Jaiswal episode brought a lot of condemnation for the U.P. government and police, but it has not been a deterrent. A few days later, the Azamgarh police arrested a stringer working with a Hindi daily after he clicked photographs of children mopping the floor of their school. The police alleged that the scribe was engaging in extortion, but his colleagues contended that he was falsely implicated due to a grudge nursed against him by the local station house officer. On September 7, five journalists in Bijnor were booked for ‘promoting enmity’ after they reported that a Dalit family had put its ‘house on sale’ after being denied water from a village hand pump. The police alleged that the reporters had concocted the story to show the administration in poor light.

Showing solidarity

In all these cases, journalists staged protests, but little has been achieved. The daily nature of news, conflicting business interests, toothless journalist organisations, and a disconnect between the mainstream English language press and the regional press hinders any united and sustained call for action.
According to the 2019 World Press Freedom Index, India ranks 140 out of 180 countries. At such a bleak time, it is crucial for the media to rise above these factors, show solidarity towards its own, and constantly question the excesses of state power, while improving working conditions for those on the margins. After all, what is at stake is truth itself.

Major defence contracts for local industry

The Defence Ministry has signed a ₹5,500-crore contract for additional indigenous Akash surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems and in the next one year, contracts worth ₹70,000-80,000 crore are expected to be signed with Indian industry.
“Akash SAM contract was signed two days back worth ₹5,500 crore. Though Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) and Bharat Dynamics Limited (BDL) are the main vendors, there are almost 150 private vendors involved,” Apurva Chandra, Director-General, Acquisition, in the Defence Ministry, said at a session on Make in India organized by the Society of Indian Defence Manufacturers. The deal is for seven additional Akash units for the Indian Air Force.
The government aims to build a $10 trillion economy by 2032 and defence has been identified as one of the most prominent sectors to contribute to this growth, said Defence Minister Rajnath Singh.

Govt.-funded NGOs come under RTI ambit, says SC

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) “substantially” financed by the government fall within the ambit of the Right to Information Act, the Supreme Court held in a judgment on Tuesday.
A Bench of Justices Deepak Gupta and Aniruddha Bose laid down that NGOs which receive considerable finances from the government or are essentially dependent on the government fall under the category of “public authority” defined in Section 2(h) of the Right to Information (RTI) Act of 2005.
This means that they have to disclose vital information, ranging from finances to hierarchy to decisions to functioning, to citizens who apply under RTI. An NGO, the court said, may also include societies which are neither owned or controlled by the government, but if they are significantly funded by the government, directly or indirectly, they come under the RTI Act.
The court defined “substantial” as a “large portion.”
“It does not necessarily have to mean a major portion or more than 50%. No hard and fast rule can be laid down in this regard. Substantial financing can be both direct or indirect,” Justice Gupta wrote in the judgment.
If government gives land in a city free of cost or on heavy discount to hospitals, educational institutions or any such body, this in itself could also be substantial financing, the judgment explained.

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